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ABSTRACT
Wireless networks play an important role in our everyday
lives, at the workplace and at home. However, they are also
relatively vulnerable: physically located off site, attackers
can circumvent wireless security protocols such as WEP,
WPA, and even to some extent WPA2, presenting a secu-
rity risk to the entire network. To address this problem, we
propose SecureAngle, a system designed to operate along-
side existing wireless security protocols, adding defense in
depth. SecureAngle leverages multi-antenna APs to profile
the directions at which a client’s signal arrives, using this
angle-of-arrival (AoA) information to construct signatures
that uniquely identify each client. We identify SecureAn-
gle’s role of providing a fine-grained location service in a
multi-path indoor environment. With this location informa-
tion, we investigate how an AP might create a “virtual fence”
that drops frames received from clients physically located
outside a building or office. With SecureAngle signatures,
we also identify how an AP can prevent malicious parties
from spoofing the link-layer address of legitimate clients.
We discuss how SecureAngle might aid whitespace radios
in yielding to incumbent transmitters, as well as its role in
directional downlink transmissions with uplink AoA infor-
mation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Net-
work Architecture and Design—Wireless communica-
tion
General Terms
Design, experimentation, measurement, security
Keywords
Wireless, 802.11, SecureAngle, Angle of arrival
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, wireless data connectivity has
continued its transition into an essential utility. En-
terprises, city governments, and homes have rolled out
wireless local-area networks across buildings, campuses,
and even entire cities. Cellular phones are ubiquitous,
with the steady progression in cellular standards driving
data rates increasingly higher to meet an increasing de-
mand. By these measures, wireless networks have been
a staggering success.
However, from a security perspective, wireless access
points present a number of difficulties. To see why,
consider a wireless network in the local area. Once
an attacker has compromised an access point, she may
both eavesdrop on users’ traffic and inject traffic into
the wireless network. Security protocols such as WEP,
WPA, LEAP, and WPA2 (IEEE 802.11i) have been pro-
posed in the past few years, however they have a track
record of being compromised [16, 13, 4]. Moreover, once
vulnerabilities are discovered, they are slow to be fixed:
six years after WEP was known to be insecure, Bittau
et al. reported that a staggering 76% of secured APs in
London still used it [5].
The result is an ongoing competition between new ex-
ploits and better wireless security protocols. To funda-
mentally change this status quo, we propose SecureAn-
gle, an approach to wireless security designed to provide
defense in depth, operating alongside and strengthening
protocol-based wireless security measures.
The other recent trend in the design of both local- and
metropolitan-area wireless access points is the dramat-
ically increasing number of antennas at the AP, mainly
to bolster capacity and coverage with multiple-input,
multiple-output (MIMO) techniques. IEEE 802.11n and
Long Term Evolution (LTE, also known as 4G) are the
most recent standards in local-area and cellular net-
works, respectively, and both exploit MIMO extensively
through the use of many antennas at the access point.
We believe that in the future, the number of antennas
at the access point will increase several-fold, to meet
the demand for MIMO links and spatial division multi-
plexing [15].
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Figure 1: SecureAngle’s principle of operation: (a) The phase of the signal goes through a 2pi cycle
every radio wavelength λ. (b) The complex representation of the sent (filled dot) and received
(crosses) signals at both antennas in (c). Phase corresponds to angle measured from the positive
in-phase (I) axis. (c) A signal arriving at bearing θ to two antennas.
The key observation we make in this paper is that
with the right signal processing at the physical layer
and a simple, environment-independent calibration step
described in §2.2, we can add a layer of security to an
LTE, 802.11n, or other multi-antenna access point. We
accomplish this by indirectly measuring the distances
between an incoming signal’s arrival at each antenna,
using these measurements to identify the incoming sig-
nal’s angles-of-arrival, as we describe in §2.1. Secure-
Angle can then use this AoA information to construct
an AoA signature that is unique to each client and ex-
tremely difficult for an attacker to forge. Even if an
attacker has the location information of both client and
AP, it’s not easy for the attacker to forge the direct
path AoA and even more difficult for the attacker to
forge all the multipath AoAs. Doing so would require
the attacker to know the locations of all obstacles in the
vicinity of the AP and client. The combined direct path
and reflection path AoAs form the unique signature for
each client. With direct path AoA data from two APs,
fine indoor location information can also be obtained.
We show that AoA signatures have systems security
value with two representative applications. We are not
replacing any exiting security protocol. SecureAngle
works along with them and adds another layer of secu-
rity. In both applications, our threat model consists of
an attacker equipped with an omnidirectional antenna,
directional antenna (as the attackers were equipped in
the TJ Maxx attacks of 2006 [8]), or antenna array,
and who has successfully penetrated the protocol-based
security in use at the access point, whatever that may
be. Demonstrating useful applications under this rather
strong attacker model substantiates our claim that Se-
cureAngle provides defense in depth against wireless ex-
ploits; we now describe the two applications for which
we believe SecureAngle can be of most immediate use.
Virtual fences. We investigate restriction of use to
the building or room containing the access point. This
would be appropriate, for example, in an enterprise set-
ting where the company is contained in a secured build-
ing, and it is desired that only clients within the build-
ing be allowed wireless access. With direct path AoA
information obtained from multiple SecureAngle APs,
high-precision indoor location can be determined to en-
able this service.
Address spoofing prevention. Another application
of AoA-based signatures is to aid systems that detect
network anomalies and misconfigurations [9, 1], such as
when a client spoofs the link-layer address of a legiti-
mate stationary client. Link-layer address spoofing can
grant unauthorized access, if the only method of wire-
less security is an address-based access control list, and
spoofing often forms the basis of more sophisticated at-
tacks against the security protocols we mention above.
For two clients located at different locations, their AoA
signatures are very unlikely to be the same. A funda-
mental challenge for this application is that AoA signa-
tures change to some degree when obstacles in the envi-
ronment or clients themselves move, and therefore must
be tracked and updated. There also must be a signif-
icant difference between the certified signature and an
attacker’s signature so that they can be discriminated
from each other.
We detail these two applications (§2), present experi-
mental evidence for their feasibility (§3), discuss related
work (§4), and conclude the paper with a discussion of
other more future-looking applications of SecureAngle
signatures (§5).
2. DESIGN
We now describe SecureAngle bottom-up, starting
with a description from first principles of how we calcu-
late client signatures based on their transmissions’ angle
of arrival at the access point, and culminating with a
system-level sketch.
2.1 Angle of arrival signatures
In both indoor and outdoor wireless channels, a sender’s
signal reflects off objects in the environment, resulting
in multiple copies of the signal arriving at the access
point; this phenomenon is known as multipath. For
clarity of exposition, we first describe how to compute
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angle of arrival when there is just one path from trans-
mitter to access point, then generalize the principles to
handle multipath wireless propagation.
Phase of the wireless signal. The key to comput-
ing angle of arrival of a wireless signal is to analyze its
phase, a quantity that progresses linearly from zero to
2pi every radio wavelength λ along the path from client
to access point, as shown in Figure 1(a). This means
that the access point receives signals with an added
phase determined by the path length d from the client.
Phase is particularly easy to analyze because software-
defined and hardware radios represent the phase of the
wireless signal graphically using an in-phase-quadrature
(I-Q) plot, as shown in Figure 1(b), where angle mea-
sured from the I axis indicates phase. Using the I-Q
plot, we see that the distance d adds a phase of 2pid/λ
as shown by the angle measured from the I axis to the
cross labeled x1 (representing the signal received at an-
tenna one). Furthermore, at the access point with two
antennas depicted in Figure 1(c), the distance along a
path arriving at bearing θ is a fraction of a wavelength
greater to the second antenna than it is to the first, the
fraction depending on θ, the angle of arrival.
These facts suggest a particularly simple way to com-
pute θ at a two-antenna access point in the absence of
multipath. First, use a software-defined or hardware
radio to measure x1 and x2 directly, compute the phase
of each (∠x1 and ∠x2), and then solve for θ (∠x1−∠x2
is between −pi and pi) as:
θ = arcsin
(
∠x2 − ∠x1
pi
)
(1)
In real-world multipath environments, however, Equa-
tion 1 breaks down because multiple paths’ signals sum
in the I-Q plot, breaking the simple two-antenna expo-
sition above. However, adding antennas can resolve the
ambiguity. The best known AoA estimation algorithms
are based on eigenstructure analysis of a correlation ma-
trix formed by samplewise-multiplying the raw signal
from the lth antenna with the raw signal from the mth
antenna, then computing the mean of the result. The
lth column and mth row of this m×l matrix is therefore
the mean correlation between the lth and mth anten-
nas’ signals. The principles of these algorithms are the
same as in the two antenna case, but the mathematics
are more involved; we refer the interested reader to the
MUSIC [12] algorithm for more information.
The output of such AoA estimation algorithms, shown
below in §3, is a pseudospectrum: a continuous plot of
likelihood versus angle. We use the pseudospectrum as
our client signature.
2.2 Access point calibration
Equipping the access point with multiple antennas
is necessary for SecureAngle, but does not suffice to
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Figure 2: SecureAngle physical layer design.
All 2.4 GHz oscillators are synchronized, and
inputs to the eight receivers switch between
the antennas and the signal generator (labeled
“USRP2”); we use the latter for calibration.
calculate angle of arrival as described in the preceding
section. As we see in the right-hand section of Fig-
ure 2 labeled “WARP,” each radio receiver incorporates
a 2.4 GHz oscillator whose purpose is to convert the
incoming radio frequency signal to its representation in
I-Q space shown, for example, above in Figure 1(b). An
undesirable consequence of this downconversion step is
that it introduces an unknown phase offset to the result-
ing signal in I-Q space, rendering our proposed method
of measuring angle of arrival (and MIMO) inoperable.
To remedy this, MIMO systems phase lock each ra-
dio’s oscillator together, so that they run at exactly the
same frequency. We represent this by the dotted line
between oscillators in Figure 2. This suffices for MIMO,
but not for our application, because the downconverters
of even phase-locked systems introduce an unknown but
constant phase difference to each receiver, which man-
ifests as an unknown phase added to the constellation
points in Figure 1(b).
Our solution is to calibrate the array, measuring each
phase offset directly. The USRP2 in Figure 2 transmits
a continuous 2.4 GHz carrier through a 36 dB attenua-
tor, which we split into eight signals and feed into the
radio front ends. Since each of the eight paths from the
USRP2 to a radio receiver is of equal length, the sig-
nals we measure when the switches in Figure 2 are each
in the lower position yield seven relative phase offsets
for antennas 2–8, relative to antenna one. Subtracting
these relative phase offsets from the incoming signals
over the air then cancels the unknown phase difference,
and the methods of §2.1 become applicable.
2.3 System design
In this section, we sketch how the above techniques
can be integrated with a functioning wireless network,
for both our representative applications.
2.3.1 Virtual fences
Using the SecureAngle signatures described above, we
demonstrate in Section 3 that after overhearing just one
packet, it is possible to measure approximately three
quarters of our clients’ bearings to the access point to
3
Figure 3: The SecureAngle prototype. Two
Rice WARP platforms (left) provide a total of
eight antennas and radio chains, while a cable-
connected USRP2 software-defined radio (right)
calibrates the array.
within 2.5◦ and all clients’ bearings to within 14◦ with
95% confidence. We obtain this result even in an in-
door office environment where multipath reflections are
highly prevalent. In an environment where more than
two access points are computing this bearing informa-
tion, the intersection point of the direct path AoA is
identified as the location of client.
2.3.2 Address spoofing prevention
To prevent address spoofing, SecureAngle records a
legitimate client’s signature Scl during the initial train-
ing stage and associates this signature with the MAC
address. For all the incoming packets associated with
this MAC address, signatures will be compared with
Scl , the experimental hypothesis being that there is a
significant difference between Scl and an attacker’s sig-
nature, so that they can be discriminated from each
other. Since Scl changes when the client or nearby ob-
stacles move, the AP needs to track and update Scl . We
can accomplish this using uplink traffic that the clients
send to the AP. If a malicious client injects traffic into
the network , the AP can detect the consequent change
of signature and flag the injection event.
3. EVALUATION
In this section, we provide some empirical evidence to
support SecureAngle’s utility for the two applications
outlined above.
Prototype implementation. The prototype in Fig-
ure 3 uses two WARP FPGA-based wireless platforms,
each equipped with four radio front ends and four an-
tennas. The WARPs run a custom hardware design
of WARPLab calibrated as described in §2.2. The two
WARP boards are also modified to share the same sam-
pling clocks to remove frequency offset. The eight an-
tennas attached to WARP are placed in linear or circu-
lar arrangements.1 In the linear arrangement, they are
1The AoA range for the linear arrangement is between −90
and 90◦, since clients on the two sides of the line formed by
the antennas are not differentiable. The circular arrange-
ment solves this problem effectively.
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Figure 4: Testbed environment: Soekris clients
are numbered, and the WARP access point is
labeled “AP.”
spaced at a half wavelength distance (6.13 cm). The cir-
cular arrangement is actually an octagon with 4.7 cm
sides and an antenna at each corner. We place the pro-
totype access point at the point marked “AP” in our
testbed, shown in Figure 4.
To capture traffic, the WARPs sample and buffer
20 MHz of signal bandwidth over time periods of 0.4 ms
in length, then transfer the buffered samples over Ether-
net to a computer running Matlab, on which we realize
the Schmidl-Cox [11] OFDM packet detection algorithm
to locate packets in the raw samples. In real wire-
less networks, measurements based on just one signal
sample as described above are sensitive to background
noise and interference from other senders. We there-
fore detect individual packets in the incoming stream
of samples, and compute the correlation matrix to ob-
tain mean phase differences with each entire packet.
3.1 Measurement accuracy
The first question we ask is: how accurately can Se-
cureAngle determine the bearing to a client? To an-
swer this question, we examine pseudospectra from the
20 Soekris clients shown in Figure 4. We are able to
obtain very accurate bearing results for all the clients
regardless of proximity to the AP or location inside or
outside the AP’s room. In an indoor environment with
strong multipath propagation, reflections may generate
false positive direct path AoA results. It is critical for
us to eliminate these false positive AoAs if we are to
determine the true bearing of clients.
Figure 5 shows the bearing results for all the clients
with a circular AP antenna arrangement. With the pro-
posed scheme, we are able to obtain the pseudospectrum
graph which indicates the likelihood of energy received
at each angle from 0 to 360◦ (examples of the pseu-
dospectrum are shown in Figs. 6 and 7). We compute
the bearing of each client as the angle corresponding to
the maximum point on its pseudospectrum. We com-
pute 10 pseudospectra for each client, each from a dif-
ferent packet, and plot the mean obtained bearing as
well as 99% confidence interval in Figure 5. Client 6
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Figure 5: Measured versus ground truth bearing
estimation for Soekris clients in the office envi-
ronment shown in Figure 4 (error bars indicate
99% confidence intervals).
and 12 have greater variance as Client 12 is blocked
partially by a large cement pillar while client 6 is far
away and multipath reflections are strong. Client 11
is completely blocked by the pillar and gives a little
bit smaller value close to the true angle. The mean
99% confidence interval for all the clients is as small
as 7◦. Even with very strong multipath reflections, the
direct path bearing corresponds to the highest peak in
the pseudospectrum most of the time. For those few
scenarios which the reflection paths are much stronger
than the direct path, multiple APs can be applied to
remove the false positive direct path AoA as those false
positive AoAs obtained from different APs may not in-
tersect with each other. Furthermore, direct path AoA
is relatively stable compared with reflection path AoAs.
3.2 Measurement stability
SecureAngle depends not just on the stability of sin-
gle antenna channels, but also specifically on the stabil-
ity, or coherence time of the multiple antenna channel
shown in Figure 1(c). Studies of a 4x4 mimo channel at
2 GHz find median coherence times of between 25 ms
for a walking-speed receiver and 125 ms for a station-
ary receiver [3] outdoors, where more and faster mo-
tion in the environment shortens coherence times [6].
Figure 6 shows AoA pseudospectra from three differ-
ent clients with a linear AP antenna arrangement. To
show that the AoA signatures are stable with time, each
subplot of Figure 6 is composed of pseudospectra gen-
erated from packets recorded zero, one, 10, 100 and
1000 seconds, as well as one hour and one day later, all
from the same client. We choose three representative
clients: one (Client 2) located in another room nearby
the access point. The other two clients are located in
the same room as the access point but one (Client 5)
is near by and the other (Client 10) is far away. The
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Figure 6: Stability of AoA signatures for three
clients: each curve on each subplot shows the
client’s pseudospectrum at logarithmically-sp-
aced time intervals.
highest peak on the pseudospectrum graph usually cor-
responds to the direct path between the client and ac-
cess point. We see clearly on the figure that the direct-
path peak is quite stable while the multipath reflection
peaks (smaller peaks) sometimes vary. From minute to
minute, pseudospectra are quite stable, suggesting that
for the purpose of protection against address spoofing,
they can be tracked in the presence of normal indoor
motion.
3.3 Measurement resolution
We show the effect of number of antennas on the AoA
results in this section. When there are not many multi-
path reflections and the direct path signal is relatively
strong, even two and four antennas can generate quite
accurate results. However, in a more challenging en-
vironment when the direct path is relatively weak and
multipath reflections are strong, increasing the number
of antennas will result in more accurate bearing estima-
tion. Another benefit of having more antennas is that
the resolution of the pseudospectrum graph improves.
We take Client 12 blocked by the pillar which has strong
multipath reflections as the example. In Figure 7, we
show the AoA pseudospectrum plot for the same packet
with 2, 4, 6 and 8 antennas in linear arrangement.
A two-antenna arrangement generates one peak. Four
antennas yield better resolution than two antennas with
the measured bearing closer to the true bearing. How-
ever, with four antennas, it is not possible to differen-
tiate two incoming signals within a 45◦ range. If the
direct path and reflection path are within a 45◦ range,
four antennas will not be able to generate two peaks for
each of them, instead, one peak with an angle between
the two incoming signals will be seen. However, this
bearing is usually close to the true bearing. Once six
antennas are used, we find that both the direct path
and multipath components are visible. With eight an-
tennas, we have even better resolution and more accu-
rate results. With future wireless acess point designs
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Figure 7: More antennas improve resolution and
accuracy, resulting in a more specific signatures.
(such as SAM [15]) scaling up the number of antennas
at the access point, the trend favors our design.
4. RELATEDWORK
Many schemes have been proposed to capture signa-
tures that characterize wireless clients’ identity and lo-
cation. The most widely used physical layer information
is received signal strength (RSS) [2, 7]. While readily
available from commodity hardware RSS is very coarse
compared to physical-layer information, so is prone to
error if few packets are available. Furthermore, attack-
ers with directional antennas can subvert RSS-based
systems [10]. Wong et al. [17] investigate the use of
AoA information for localization using high-bandwidth
(1 GHz) sampling rate. They apply a channel impulse
response method which requires a probe packet with
a long training sequence and a very high SINR (60
dB in their experiemnts) which is not realistic in real
life. Geo-fencing [14] utilizes directional antennas and
frames coding approach to control the indoor coverage
boundary. Each AP sends out partial frames and only
the clients located in the overlapping region covered by
multiple APs can decode all the packets. Compared to
Geo-fencing, SecureAngle does not mandate the rear-
rangement of traffic in the wireless network, but has not
yet been shown to offer location-based security guar-
antees in the presence of adversaries with directional
antennas – we leave this for future work.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have described SecureAngle, a system that iden-
tifys angle-of-arrival data from the physical layer to fin-
gerprint clients, adding a layer of wireless security.
In future work, we plan to integrate packet detection
and AoA algorithms into the FPGA. We also plan to
test our applications with client mobility and track the
mobility trace with multiple APs. 3D location tracking
will also be considered. Seamless location service for
mobile devices using both GPS and SecureAngle’s bear-
ing estimation will be possible. This would cover both
indoors where GPS signals do not propagate and out-
doors. Based on our experiments, we believe SecureAn-
gle could be as accurate as GPS. With AoA information
obtained, high efficiency downlink directional transmis-
sion will also be feasible resulting in higher throughput
and better reliability.
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